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Due  in  large  part  to  intense  takeover  activity  during  the 
198Os,  the  extent  of  American  firms'  industrial  diversification 
declined  significantly  during  the  second  half  of  the  decade.  The 
mean  number  of  industries  in  which  firms  operated  declined  14 
percent,  and  the  fraction  of  single-industry  firms  increased  54 
percent.  Firms  that  were  "born"  during  the  period  were  much  less 
diversified  than  those  that  lldiedll,  and  lVcontinuingl@  firms 
reduced  the  number  of  industries  in  which  they  operated.  Using 
plant-level  Census  Bureau  data,  we  show  that  productivity  is 
inversely  related  to  the  degree  of  diversification:  holding 
constant  the  number  of  the  parent  firm's  plants,  the  greater  the 
number  of  industries  in  which  the  parent  operates,  the  lower  the 
productivity  of  its  plants.  Hence  de-diversification  is  one  of 
the  means  by  which  recent  takeovers  have  contributed  to  U.S. 
productivity  growth.  We  also  find  that  the  effectiveness  of 
regulations  governing  disclosure  by  companies  of  financial 
information  for  their  industry  segments  was  low  when  they  were 
introduced  in  the  1970s  and  has  been  declining  ever  since. 
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In  previous  research  (Lichtenberg  and  Siegel,  1987,  1989a, 
1989b;  Lichtenberg  and  Kim,  1989),  we  presented  evidence  that 
certain  types  of  corporate  control  transactions  during  the  1970s 
and  1980s  tended  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  U.S.  enterprises. 
In  particular,  we  showed  that  the  relative  (to  industry  mean) 
total-factor  productivity  (TFP)  of  (1)  manufacturing  plants 
involved  in  ownership  changes  in  the  197Os,  (2)  plants  involved 
in  leveraged  buyouts  (LBOs)  in  the  198Os,  and  (3)  airlines, 
involved  in  mergers  during  1970-84,  tended  to  increase  in  the 
years  following  the  transaction.  We  provided  a  number  of  reasons 
why  these  changes  in  corporate  control  resulted  in  improvements 
in  efficiency.  First,  we  argued  that  lVre-matchingVV  of  owners  and 
plants  may  yield  efficiency  gains  if  the  lVguality  of  the  match" 
between  an  owner  and  plant  is  heterogeneous  and  cannot  be  known 
with  certainty  unless  the  match  is  made.  Second,  we  demonstrated 
that  ownership  changes  are  associated  with  substantial  reductions 
in  corporate  overhead  (e.g.,  the  ratio  of  administrative 
employment  to  total  employment),  and  that  this  represents  an 
important  source  of  productivity  gains.  Third,  both  managers' 
incentives  and  their  opportunities  to  engage  in  inefficient 
behavior  may  be  much  lower  under  an  LB0  partnership  arrangement 
than  they  are  in  a  typical  publicly-held  corporation.  Fourth, 
airline  mergers  tended  to  result  in  significant  improvements  in 
capacity  utilization  (load  factor). 
This  paper  examines  another  means  by  which  changes  in 
corporate  control  may  bring  about  improvements  in  operating 2 
efficiency:  by  reducing  the  extent  of  industrial  diversification, 
i.e.  the  number  of  industries  in  which  a  firm  operates.  Our 
previous  research  suggested  the  existence  of  the  following  causal 
relationship: 
(+) 
Control  changes  ------------>  Productivity  (1) 
where  the  (+)  above  the  arrow  denotes  a  positive  relationship. 
We  will  attempt  to  establish  that  the  sign  of  this  "reduced  form" 
relationship  is  positive  in  part  because  of  the 
of  the  VVstructuralll  relationships  between  these 
a  mediating  variable: 
(negative)  signs 
two  variables  and 
Control  changes  ----->  Diversification  ------>  Productivity  (2) 
In  other  words,  control  changes  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  led  to 
increases  in  productivity  in  part  because  these  changes  (unlike 
the  control  changes  of  the  earlier  postwar  era,  particularly  the 
late  1960s)  reduced  the  extent  of  industrial  diversification,  and 
diversification  is  inversely  related  to  productivity. 
Our  first  objective  will  be  to  provide  empirical  support  for 
the  second  of  the  two  hypotheses  indicated  in  (2)  above,  the  one 
concerning  the  effect  of  diversification  on  productivity. 
Several  previous  papers  have  examined  the  effect  of 
diversification  on  other  measures  of  firm  performance,  such  as 
profitability,  Tobin's  q  and  shareholder  wealth.  Ravenscraft  and 
Scherer  found  that  @'unrelated"  lines  of  business  acquired  during 
the  conglomerate  merger  boom  of  the  late  1960s  experienced  below- 
average  profitability  in  the  1970s  and  were  often  subsequently 3 
divested.  Wernerfelt  and  Montgomery  found  that  "narrowly 
diversified  firms  do  better  [i.e.,  have  higher  values  of  q, 
ceteris  naribus]  than  widely  diversified  firms."  Merck, 
Shleifer,  and  Vishny  found  that  diversification  reduced  bidding 
firms'  shareholder  wealth  in  the  198Os,  although  it  failed  to  do 
so  in  the  1970s.  However  we  are  not  aware  of  any  previous 
research  on  the  effect  of  diversification  on  TFP--output  per  unit 
of  total  input--  which  is  generally  regarded  by  economist&  as.the 
purest  measure  of  technical  efficiency.  We  will  estimate  this 
effect  using  rich  and  detailed  Census  Bureau  data  on  over  17 
thousand  manufacturing  establishments  in  the  year  1980. 
Our  investigation  of  the  first  hypothesis  indicated  in  (2), 
concerning  the  effects  of  (recent)  control  changes  on  the  extent 
of  diversification,  will  be  based  on  a  different  data  set,  and 
will  be  less  direct.  Using  Compustat  data,  we  will  describe  and 
analyze  changes  between  January  1985  and  November  1989  in  the 
distribution  of  companies  by  the  number  of  industries  in  which 
they  operate.  Due  to  data  limitations,  control  changes  won't  be 
explicitly  accounted  for  in  this  analysis.  But  because  the  1980s 
was  a  period  of  high  and  accelerating  takeover  activity--the 
value  of  takeover  transactions  as  a  fraction  of  GNP  increased 
from  1.5  percent  in  1979  to  4.5  percent  in  1986--takeovers  are 
probably  responsible  for  much  of  the  change  in  the  extent  of 
diversification. 
In  addition  to  analyzing  one  of  the  causes  (control  changes) 
and  effects  (productivity)  of  diversification,  we  will  also 4
investigate the issue of segmented financial reporting by
diversified companies. In the mid-1970s the Financial Accounting
Standards Board and the Securities  and Exchange  Commission began
requiring firms to disclose financial data for individual
business segments. Again using Compustat data, we will assess
the effectiveness of these regulations by examining the  time-
series of distributions of companies by number of reported
segments, and comparing it to the distributions of companies by
the  tltruelU  number of industries in which they operate.
I. Industrial Diversification and  Productivitv  of  Manufacturinq
Plants
The measure of productivity that we will use is the  same as
the one employed in our previous analyses of the effects of
takeovers and leveraged buyouts on productivity (Lichtenberg and
Siegel 1987,  198913). It is  a  residual from a production function
of the following form, estimated separately by 4-digit SIC
industry:
In   VQij =  poj  +  pLj   In   Lij  +
BKj   In   Kij  +  BMj   In   VMij  +  uij (3)
where VQ denotes the value of production (the value of shipments
adjusted for changes in finished-goods and work-in-process
inventories); L denotes labor input  ("production-worker-
equivalentI  manhours); K denotes capital input (the "perpetual
inventoryt' estimate of the net stock of  plant and equipment); VM
denotes the value of materials consumed (materials purchased
adjusted for changes in raw-materials inventories): u is adisturbance  term;  and  the  subscript  ij  refers  to  establishment  i 
in  4-digit  industry  j.'  All  of  the  data  (with  one  exception 
noted  below)  for  this  study  are  for  the  year  1980.  Output  and 
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materials  are  measured  in  nominal  terms  because  the  Census 
database  does  not  include  establishment-specific  deflators.  It 
is  conventional  to  assume  that  output  and  materials  prices  do  not 
vary  across  establishments  within  an  industry,  which  would  imply 
that  the  nominal  measures  are  proportional  to  their  real  ’ 
counterparts,  although  there  is  some  evidence  inconsistent  with 
this  hypothesis  (see  Abbott  (1988)).  Thus  the  computed  residual 
may  be  capturing  price  differences  as  well  as  productivity 
differences.  Because  eq.  (3)  was  estimated  separately  by 
industry,  the  residual  for  a  given  observation  measures  the 
percentage  deviation  of  that  establishment's  TFP  from  the  mean 
TFP  of  all  establishments  in  the  same  industry.  By  construction, 
of  course,  the  residuals  have  a  mean  value  of  zero. 
A  basic  premise  of  our  research  design  is  that  the 
industrial  structure  of  a  plant's  parent  firm--measured  in  terms 
of  the  number  and  industry-distribution  of  its  plants--determines 
'This  3-factor  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  may  be 
regarded  as  a  local  first-order  logarithmic  approximation  to  any 
arbitrary  production  function.  Maddala  (1979,  p.  309)  has  shown 
that,  at  least  within  a  "limited  class  of  functions...(viz.  Cobb- 
Douglas,  generalized  Leontief,  homogeneous  translog,  and 
homogeneous  quadratic)  differences  in  the  functional  form  produce 
negligible  differences  in  measures  of  multi-factor  productivity." 
This  is  because  these  different  functional  forms  differ  in  their 
elasticities  of  substitution  (which  depends  on  the  second 
derivatives  of  the  production  function)  whereas  productivity 
depends  primarily  on  the  first  derivatives. 6 
the  plant's  performance  (productivity).  We  assume  that  the 
parent's  structure  is  exogenous  with  respect  to  the  plant's 
performance.  It  is  possible,  however,  that  the  (average) 
performance  of  a  firm's  plants  may  in  the  long  run  influence  the 
firm's  industrial  structure.  Some  observers  have  suggested  that 
it  is  very  profitable  firms  with  large  free  cash  flows  that  are 
most  likely  to  engage  in  diversifying  acquisitions.  These 
profitable  firms  are  likely  to  own  plants  that  are  efficient. 
relative  to  their  respective  industries  (although  they  may  merely 
own  lVaveragell  plants  in  industries  with  above-average 
profitability).  Thus  feedback  from  plant  performance  to  firm 
structure  might  be  expected  to  bias  upward  the  coefficient  on  a 
diversification  index  in  a  productivity  equation. 
Our  research  strategy  is  to  estimate  cross-sectional 
regressions  of  the  plant's  productivity  residual  (RESIDUAL)  on 
several  different  measures  of  its  parent  firm's  industrial 
structure.  This  may  be  repesented  algebraically  by 
RESIDUAL  =  f(STRUCTURE)  (4) 
The  measures  included  in  the  STRUCTURE  vector  are  (1)  SINGLE,  a 
dummy  variable  equal  to  one  if  the  firm  operates  only  one  plant, 
and  otherwise  equal  to  zero;  (2)  NPLANTS,  the  total  number  of 
manufacturing  plants  owned  and  operated  by  the  firm;  (3)  NINDS, 
the  total  number  of  4-digit  SIC  manufacturing  industries  in  which 
the  firm  operates;  and  (4)  SAMEIND,  the  fraction  of  the  firm's 
plants  that  operate  in  the  same  industry  as  this  plant.  Due  to 
the  way  in  which  our  sample  was  constructed,  there  are  some problems  associated  with  the  measurement  of  the  last  three 
variables.  The  ultimate  source  of  the  data  is  the  1980  Annual 
Survey  of  Manufactures  (ASM),  which  collected  data  from  a  sample 
of  approximately  50  thousand  manufacturing  establishments,  out  of 
a  population  of  roughly  350  thousand  establishments.2  Our 
analysis  is  based  on  a  nonrandom  subset  (constructed  for  our 
earlier  (Lichtenberg  and  Siegel,  1987)  research  project)  of  about 
18  thousand  of  the  ASM  establishments.  All  of  the  establishments 
in  the  subset  we  examined  had  been  in  continuous  operation  and 
had  been  included  in  the  ASM  sample  since  at  least  1972.  Thus 
the  sample  is  biased  towards  mature  establishments  that  are 
themselves  large  or  that  are  owned  by  large  firms.  We  calculated 
NPLANTS  simply  by  counting  the  number  of  plants  within  the  subset 
of  18  thousand  with  the  same  parent  company  identification  code 
as  a  given  plant.  We  calculated  NINDS  by  counting  the  number  of 
industries  in  which  these  plants  primarily  operated.  Because 
these  counts  were  based  on  the  subset  of  18  thousand 
establishments  rather  than  on  the  entire  population  of  350 
thousand  establishments,  they  are  subject  to  measurement  error. 
In  particular,  they  are  lower  bounds.3  Although  the  measurement 
'Large  establishments  (those  with  greater  than  250  employees) 
are  sampled  with  certainty,  and  smaller  establishments  are  sampled 
with  probability  inversely  related  to  their  size. 
3The  downward  bias  in  NPLANTS  and  NINDS  would  perhaps  have 
been  reduced  if  we  had  used  data  for  an  ASM  year  prior  to  1978. 
Beginning  in  1978,  to  reduce  the  cost  of  the  ASM  the  Census  Bureau 
switched  from  sampling  with  certainty  all  establishments  of  large 
firms  to  only  sampling  large  establishments  with  certainty. 
Even  if  they  were  based  on  the  entire  Census  of  Manufactures, 
NPLANTS  and  NINDS  would  still  be  truncated  due  to  the  omission  of 8 
error  is  not  of  the  classical  (e.g.  normal,  i.i.d.)  form,  one 
suspects  that  it  would  bias  the  coefficients  and  t-statistics  on 
these  variables  towards  zero.  The  variable  SINGLE  is  not  subject 
to  measurement  error  (at  least  of  this  kind),  since  for 
administrative  purposes  the  Census  Bureau  records  this  attribute 
in  the  establishment  data  files.  Even  if  NINDS  were  not  subject 
to  truncation,  it  would  still  undoubtedly  be  a  cruder  (noisier) 
measure  of  firm  diversification  than  the  standard  Gort-Herfindahl 
index  or  the  concentric  index  of  Caves,  Porter,  and  Spence 
(1980). 
The  performance  measure  we  have  chosen--the  residual  from 
the  production  function  (3) --is  output  produced  by  the  plant  per 
unit  of  total  input  employed  in  the  plant.  Some  of  the  inputs 
that  contribute  to  the  production  of  a  plant's  output,  however, 
may  not  be  employed  in  the  plant  itself;  they  may  be  employed  in 
what  the  Census  Bureau  calls  l'auxiliary  establishments.11  These 
are  establishments 
whose  employees  are  primarily  engaged  in  general  and 
business  administration;  research,  development,  and 
testing:  warehousing:  electronic  data  processing;  and 
other  supporting  services  performed  centrally  for  other 
establishments  of  the  same  company  rather  than  for 
other  companies  or  the  general  public.4 
The  primary  functions  of  these  establishments  are  to 
manage,  administer,  service,  or  support  the  activities 
of  the  other  establishments  of  the  company.' 
nonmanufacturing  establishments. 
4u.s.  Bureau  of  the  Census  (1986,  p.  A-l). 
5u.s.  Bureau  of  the  Census  (1986,  p.  2). Although  only  0.4  percent  of  the  entire 
all  industries)  recorded  in  Census  data 
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3.4  million  companies  (in 
had  at  least  one 
auxiliary  establishment,  in  1982  these  establishments  accounted 
for  about  7  percent  of  employment  and  10  percent  of  payroll  in 
the  U.S.  manufacturing  sector.6  Hence  failure  to  account  for 
auxiliary  inputs  could  result  in  seriously  distorted  estimates  of 
plant  productivity,  and  these  distortions  are  likely  to  be 
strongly  correlated  with  our  measures  of  firm  industrial' 
structure.  Fortunately,  because  we  had  access  to  firm-level  data 
on  both  total  employment  (TE)  and  employment  in  auxiliary 
establishments  (AE),  we  can  control  (imperfectly,  perhaps)  for 
inputs  employed  in  auxiliaries.7  Because  a  given  auxiliary 
establishment  typically  provides  services  to  a  number  of 
production  establishments  (plants),  there  is  a  problem  of 
allocating  the  auxiliary's  inputs  across  plants.  We  assume  that 
the  ratio  of  auxiliary  inputs  dedicated  to  a  plant  to  the  plant's 
own  employed  inputs  is  the  same  for  all  of  the  firm's  plants, 
which  implies  that  inputs  employed  within  the  plant  understate 
the  plant's  l'truel'  total  input  (including  allocated  auxiliary 
inputs)  by  the  ratio  AUXSHARE=AE/TE.  Given  this  assumption, 
%ee  Lichtenberg  and  Siegel  (1989a)  for  a  detailed  discussion 
of  the  role  of  auxiliary  establishments. 
7Since  auxiliary  employment  data  are  collected  only  in  Census 
years,  we  used  values  of  AE  and  TE  for  1982,  the  Census  year 
closest  to  1980.  The  time  misalignment  clearly  introduces  some 
error  into  the  correction  for  auxiliary  inputs,  although  we  suspect 
that  firms'  relative  values  of  the  ratio  AE/TE  are  fairly  stable 
over  time. 10 
there  are  two  alternative  ways  of  accounting  for  auxiliary  inputs 
in  our  analysis.  The  first  is  to  "inflate@'  (some  or  all  of)  the 
plant's  recorded  input  values  (e.g.,  L  and  K)  by  multiplying  them 
by  (1  +  AUXSHARE)  prior  to  calculating  the  productivity  residual 
via  eq.  (1).  The  second  is,  instead  of  inflating  the  input 
values,  to  include  AUXSHARE  as  an  explanatory  variable  in  the 
productivity  equation.  Because  the  first  approach  is  much  more 
restrictive,  and  because  it  isn't  clear  which  inputs  should\be 
inflated  by  (1  +  AUXSHARE),  we've  adopted  the  latter  procedure. 
One  additional  econometric  issue  deserves  our  attention.  As 
noted  above,  we  will  use  a  two-step  estimation  procedure  to 
analyze  the  effect  of  diversification  on  productivity.  The  first 
step  is  to  estimate  the  production  function  (3)  by  industry,  and 
to  compute  the  residuals.  The  second  step  is  to  regress  these 
residuals  on  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables.  The  formulas 
derived  by  Neter  et  al  (1985,  p.  402)  imply  that  the  variance  of 
RESIDUALij  is  Vij'Sj2(1  -  X'ij(X'jXj)“Xij)  where  Sj  is  the  standard 
error  of  the  residual  for  industry  j;  Xj  is  the  design  matrix 
from  eq.  (3)  for  industry  j;  and  Xij  is  the  ith  row  of  this  matrix 
(i.e.,  the  row  corresponding  to  the  ith  plant).  Because  this 
variance  differs  both  within  and  between  industries,  the 
disturbances  of  eq.  (4)  are  heteroskedastic.  We  will  therefore 
estimate  eq.  (4)  using  weighted  least-squares  (WLS),  with  weights 
equal  to  Vij-"'. 
Descriptive  statistics  for  our  sample  of  17,664  plants  are 
provided  in  Table  1.  Means,  standard  deviations,  and  selected 11 
quantiles  of  the  variables  are  presented  in  the  top  part  of  the 
table.  Judging  from  the  quantiles,  the  distribution  of  the 
RESIDUAL  appears  to  be  quite  symmetric,  as  we  would  hope.  Only  7 
percent  of  the  plants  in  our  sample  are  V1single-unitll  plants, 
i.e.  the  only  plants  owned  by  their  parent  firms.  The  mean  and 
median  number  of  plants  owned  by  the  parents  of  our  sample  plants 
are  23  and  11,  respectively.  The  mean  and  median  number  of 
manufacturing  industries  in  which  the  parents  operated  are  ,9 and 
5,  respectively.  The  distributions  of  both  of  these  variables 
are  obviously  quite  skewed,  so  we  will  use  the  logarithms  of 
these  variables,  rather  than  their  levels,  in  the  remainder  of 
the  empirical  analysis.  The  mean  (median)  value  of  the  fraction 
of  the  parent's  plants  operating  in  the  same  industry  as  a  given 
plant  is  45  (31)  percent.  The  sample  mean  value  of  AUXSHARE,  the 
ratio  of  auxiliary  employment  to  total  firm  employment,  is 
virtually  identical  to  the  population  (weighted)  mean  value  of  7 
percent  cited  earlier.  Although  the  production  function  (3) 
allows  for  non-constant  returns  to  scale  (since  the  input 
coefficients  aren't  constrained  to  sum  to  one),  we  will  also 
control  for  possible  scale  effects  by  including  in  the 
regressions  a  measure  of  establishment  size--total  plant 
employment  (PLANTEMP).  As  Table  1  indicates,  this  variable  is 
also  highly  skewed  (the  mean  of  525  is  almost  double  the  median), 
so  the  log  transformation  will  also  be  applied  to  it. 
Sample  correlation  coefficients  are  shown  in  the  bottom  part 
of  Table  1.  The  absolute  values  of  the  correlations  among  three variables  --NPLANTS,  NINDS,  and  SAMEIND--are  very  high  (above 
0.8).  As  we  shall  now  see,  this  fact  is  of  crucial  importance 
interpreting  our  estimates  of  the  effects  of  parent  firm 
industrial  structure  on  plant  productivity. 
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Weighted  least-squares  regressions  of  the  plant  productivity 
RESIDUAL  on  plant  and  parent  firm  characteristics  are  displayed 
in  Table  2.  Each  column  of  the  table  represents  a  separate 
regression.  The  only  regressor  in  the  first  equation  is  the 
variable  SINGLE.  The  coefficient  on  it  indicates  that  single- 
unit  establishments  are,  on  average,  5.6  percent  less  productive 
than  multi-unit  establishments  in  the  same  industry.  The 
difference  is  highly  statistically  significant.  Part  of  this 
difference  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  some  multi-unit 
establishments  are  serviced  by  auxiliary  establishments,  whereas 
(by  definition)  no  single-unit  establishments  are.  In  column  2 
we  attempt  to  control  for  auxiliary  inputs  by  including  AUXSHARE 
in  the  equation:  we  also  include  log(PLANTEMP)  to  allow  for  scale 
effects.  Including  these  regressors  reduces  the  magnitude  of  the 
SINGLE  coefficient,  but  by  only  16  percent,  and  it  remains  highly 
significant.  As  expected,  the  coefficient  on  AUXSHARE  is 
positive  and  significant,  consistent  with  the  view  that  auxiliary 
establishment  inputs  contribute  to  production  establishment 
output.  The  positive  coefficient  on  log  plant  employment  is 
significant  but  very  small,  suggesting  that  there  may  be  very 
modest  economies  of  scale. 
Because  the  mean  values  of  NINDS  for  single-  and  multi-unit 13 
establishments  are  1  and  9.6,  respectively8,  the  negative 
coefficient  on  SINGLE  might  give  the  impression  that 
diversification  has  a  positive  effect  on  productivity:  single- 
unit  plants  are  both  less  efficient  and  owned  by  less-diversified 
firms  than  multi-unit  plants.  This  impression  is  reinforced  by 
the  regression  in  column  3,  which  includes  log(NINDS)  as  a 
regressor.  Its  positive  and  significant  coefficient  implies 
\ 
that,  among  multi-unit  establishments,  the  greater  the  number  of 
industries  in  which  the  parent  operates,  the  higher  is  plant 
productivity.  So  there  is  an  apparent  positive  relationship 
between  diversification  and  productivity  both  between 
establishment  categories  (single-  vs.  multi-unit)  and  within  the 
multi-unit  category. 
This  apparently 
completely  snurious: 
positive  relationship,  however,  is 
it  results  from  failing  to  control  for  the 
number  of  plants  owned  by  the  firm  NPLANTS  and  from  the  high 
positive  correlation  noted  above  between  (the  logarithms  of) 
NINDS  and  NPLANTS.  In  column  4  we  replace  log(NINDS)  by 
log(NPLANTS).  Its  coefficient  indicates  that  productivity 
increases  with  the  number  of  plants  owned  by  the  firm.  The  low 
productivity  of  single-unit  plants  may  therefore  be  due  to  their 
low  value  of  NPLANTS,  not  their  low  value  of  NINDS.  In  column  5 
we  include  both  of  these  regressors.  The  coefficients  on  both 
'This  may  be  inferred  from  the  top  of  Table  1,  since  the  value 
of  NINDS  for  all  single-unit  plants  is  1  by  definition,  and  7 
percent  of  sample  plants  are  single-unit  plants. 14 
of  these  variables  are  very  different  from  what  they  were  when 
they  were  included  separately.  The  coefficient  on  log(NINDS) 
becomes  nesative,  almost  triples  in  magnitude  and  becomes  more 
significant.  The  coefficient  on  log(NPLANTS)  more  than  doubles 
and  also  becomes  more  significant.  The  equation  in  column  5 
reveals  that  holdins  constant  the  number  of  the  oarent  firm's 
plants,  the  sreater  the  number  of  industries  in  which  the  parent 
operates,  the  lower  the  productivity  of  its  plants. 
\ 
We  can  get  a  feeling  for  the  magnitude  of  these  effects  by 
considering  the  implications  of  moving  "halfway  across"--from  the 
. 25  quantile  to  the  .75  quantile  of--  the  distributions  of  these 
variables.  The  difference  between  the  .25  and  .75  quantile 
values  of  the  RESIDUAL  is  .22(=.10-(-.12)).  The  effect  of  a 
ceteris  paribus  decrease  in  NINDS  from  its  .75  to  its  .25 
quantile  value  is  .049  =  -.019  *  log(l  /  13),  or  22  percent  of 
this  productivity  difference.  The  effect  of  an  increase  in 
NPLANTS  from  its  .25  to  its  .75  quantile  value  is  .065  =  .023  * 
log(34  /  2),  or  30  percent  of  the  productivity  difference.  Of 
course,  in  view  of  the  high  correlation  between  NINDS  and 
NPLANTS,  the  effects  of  ceteris  naribus  changes  in  these 
variables  may  not  be  of  great  practical  significance. 
It  may  be  useful  to  offer  a  slightly  different 
interpretation  of  the  equation  in  column  5.  The  equation  may  be 
represented  as  follows:  r  =  p,  i  +  p2  p,  where  r=RESIDUAL, 
i=log(NINDS),  and  p=log(NPLANTS),  and  we  have  ignored  other  terms 
on  the  right-hand  side  for  simplicity.  This  equation  may  be 15 
rewritten  in  two  alternative  ways:  r  =  (8,  +  pZ)  i  -  p2  (i  -  p), 
and  r  =  (PI  +  PJ  P  +  P,  (i  -  P).  Thus  -pZ  =  -.023  may  be 
interpreted  as  the  effect  of  increasing  the  number  of  industries 
per  plant  (i  -  p),  holding  constant  the  total  number  of 
industries,  and  j3, =  -.019  may  be  interpreted  as  the  effect  of 
increasing  this  ratio,  holding  constant  the  total  number  of 
plants. 
Above  we  characterized  the  parent  firm's  industrial  * 
distribution  of  plants  by  NINDS,  the  number  of  industries  in 
which  it  operates.  Another  attribute  of  this  distribution  that 
may  influence  a  plant's  productivity  (conditional  on  NPLANTS)  is 
the  fraction  of  the  parent's  plants  in  the  same  industry.  Let 
NSAME  denote  the  number  of  parent's  plants  in  the  same  industry 
and  NOTHER  (=  NPLANTS  -  NSAME)  denote  the  number  in  other 
industries.  The  productivity-determination  equation  might  be 
hypothesized  to  be  RESIDUAL  =  j3 log  (NOTHER  +  (1  +  a)  NSAME)  + 
other  regressors,  where  R  is  the  percentage  difference  between 
the  productivity  effect  of  NOTHER  and  NSAME.  The  preceeding 
equation  is  nonlinear,  but  it  can  be  approximated  by  the  linear 
equation  RESIDUAL  =  /3 NPLANTS  +  JAR  SAMEIND  +  other  regressors, 
where  SAMEIND  =  NSAME/NPLANTS  is  the  fraction  of  plants  in  the 
same  industry.  The  ratio  of  the  SAMEIND  coefficient  to  the 
NPLANTS  coefficient  may  be  interpreted  as  an  estimate  of  7r,  and 
the  significance  of  r  may  be  inferred  from  the  t-statistic  on  the 
SAMEIND  coefficient. 
The  equation  shown  in  column  6  of  Table  2  includes  SAMEIND 16 
instead  of  log(NINDS).  The  coefficient  on  SAMEIND  is  positive 
and  highly  significant.  The  implied  estimate  of  a  is  1.86  (= 
.026/.014).  This  implies  that  a  unit  increase  in  the  number  of 
plants  in  the  same  industry  raises  a  plant's  productivity  almost 
three  times  as  much  as  a  unit  increase  in  the  number  of  plants  in 
other  industries.  The  regression  in  column  7  includes  both 
SAMEIND  and  log(NINDS)  as  explanatory  variables.  The  coefficient 
on  SAMEIND  is  very  small  and  insignificant,  and  the  coefficients 
on  the  other  regressors  are  essentially  identical  to  their 
counterparts  in  column  5  (although  the  standard  error  on  the 
log(NINDS)  coefficient  increases  by  a  third).  It  is  not 
surprising  that  the  SAMEIND  and  log(NINDS)  coefficients  are  not 
both  significant,  given  the  high  inverse  correlation  (-.90) 
between  these  variables.  The  fact  that  log(NINDS)  dominates 
SAMEIND  perhaps  signifies  that  plant  productivity  depends  more  on 
the  general  extent  of  parent-firm  diversification  than  it  does  on 
the  fraction  of  firm  activity  in  the  plant's  specific  line  of 
business. 
II.  Changes  in  the  Extent  of  Industrial  Diversification,  January 
1985  to  November  1989 
In  this  section  we  describe  and  analyze  changes  in  the 
extent  of  industrial  diversification  between  January  1985  and 
November  1989,  the  earliest  and  most  recent  dates  for  which  this 
kind  of  information  was  available.  The  data  for  this  section 
were  derived  from  two  editions  (corresponding  to  those  dates)  of 
the  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  File,  a  subset  of 17 
the  Business  Information  Compustat  II  file  produced  by  Standard  & 
Poorts  Compustat  Services,  Inc.  The  SIC  file  identifies  firms' 
principal  products  and  services  by  listing  up  to  90  SIC  codes  for 
each  company.  The  SIC  codes  are  derived  by  Compustat  from  Annual 
Reports  to  Shareholders  and  from  10-K  Reports  to  the  SEC.  Our 
index  of  diversification  will  be  the  same  (admittedly  crude)  one 
we  used  in  our  analysis  of  the  Census  data:  a  simple  count  of  the 
\ 
SIC  codes  reported  for  the  firm. 
Table  3  displays  mean  values  of  NSIC  (the  number  of  SIC 
codes)  and  the  number  of  observations  in  1985  and  1989.  There 
were  6505  firms  included  in  the  1985  SIC  file,  and  7541  firms  in 
the  1989  file.  The  number  of  (Vtcontinuingll)  firms  present  in 
both  files  (with  a  common  firm  identification  (CUSIP)  number)  was 
3829.  Thus  there  were  2676  "deathslV  and  3712  ltbirthsll  between 
1985  and  1989.  The  mean  value  in  1985  of  NSIC  for  all  firms 
present  in  that  year  was  5.46,  and  the  corresponding  mean  for 
1989  was  4.70.9  Hence  the  mean  declined  by  .76  (about  14 
percent),  and  this  decline  is  highly  statistically  significant. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  number  of  firms  in  the 
SIC  file  increased  about  16  percent  (from  6505  to  7541)  between 
1985  and  1989,  so  that  the  total  number  of  lldivisionsll  (industry- 
w-firms)  remained  almost  unchanged  (it  increased  by  2  percent). 
9  Because  the  unit  of  observation  here  is  the  firm,  whereas 
in  the  previous  section  it  was  the  plant,  one  would  expect  the  mean 
value  of  NSIC  to  be  lower  than  the  previously-reported  mean  value 
of  NINDS  (since  firms  with  higher  values  of  NINDS  tend  to  have  more 
plants);  this  is  indeed  the  case. 18 
Over  the  course  of  this  period,  markets  replaced  hierarchies  as 
the  medium  of  interaction  and  exchange  among  a 
number  of  divisions. 
10 
The  last  three  rows  of  the  table  indicate 
distinct  factors  contributed  to  the  decline  in 
relatively  stable 
that  three 
the  mean  value  of 
NSIC.  First,  the  mean  value  for  continuing  firms  declined:  the 
decline  was  only  about  one-third  as  great  as  for  all  firms  (-.27) 
but  was  still  highly  significant.  Second,  the  mean  value'in  I985 
for  deaths  was  substantially  higher  than  the  mean  value  in  1989 
for  births--  4.78  compared  to  3.70.  Entering  firms  were  much  less 
diversified  than  exiting  firms.  Finally,  the  number  of  births 
exceeded  the  number  of  deaths. 
Because  the  distributions  of  companies  by  NSIC  are  highly 
skewed  in  both  years,  it  may  be  appropriate  to  consider  changes 
in  the  distribution  of  the  logarithm  of  NSIC  rather  than  in  NSIC 
itself.  The  mean  of  ln(NSIC)  also  declined  about  14  percent  from 
1985  to  1989,  from  1.29  to  1.12. 
Table  4  provides  further  evidence  of  the  decline  in  the 
extent  of  diversification,  by  reporting  percentages  of  companies 
in  1985  and  1989  with  values  of  NSIC  in  selected  ranges.  The 
fraction  of  llsingle-industryV'  companies--  those  with  only  one  SIC 
code--  increased  by  54  percent,  from  16.5  to  25.4  percent.  The 
fraction  of  companies  that  were  highly  diversified--those  with 
values  of  NSIC  in  excess  of  20,  say--declined  by  37  percent,  from 
10  The  distinction  between  markets  and  hierarchies  was 
developed  by  Williamson  (1975). 19 
3.5  to  2.2  percent. 
The  results  of  the  previous  section  imply  that  the  reduction 
in  the  extent  of  diversification  between  1985  and  1989  was  a 
source  of  productivity  growth  during  that  period.  One  might 
attempt  to  estimate  the  productivity  contribution  of  de- 
diversification  simply  by  multiplying  the  change  in  the  mean 
value  of  ln(NSIC)  by  the  coefficient  on  ln(NINDS)  in  the 
productivity  equation.  This  yields  an  estimate  of  (1.12  -.1:29) 
*  -0.19  =  .0032,  or  0.3  percentage  points.  This  does  not  appear 
to  be  very  large,  but  the  estimate  may  be  distorted  for  several 
reasons.  First,  as  noted  above,  due  to  errors  in  measuring 
NINDS,  the  coefficient  on  ln(NINDS)  is  probably  biased  towards 
zero.  Second,  the  unit  of  observation  in  the  regression  analysis 
was  the  plant,  whereas  our  estimate  of  the  mean  change  in 
diversification  between  1985  and  1989  was  based  on  firm-level 
data.  Third,  the  productivity  regressions  were  based  on 
manufacturing  establishments  only,  while  nonmanufacturing 
companies  were  also  included  in  the  NSIC  calculations.  The 
estimate  of  0.3  percentage  points  is  much  larger  relative  to 
typical  nonmanufacturing  productivity  growth  rates  than  it  is 
relative  to  manufacturing  growth  rates. 
As  shown  in  the  previous  section,  the  cross-sectional 
correlation  between  a  plant's  parent's  number  of  industries 
(NINDS)  and  its  number  of  plants  (NPLANTS)  is  positive  and  very 
high  (.94).  One  might  therefore  expect  that  the  mean  value  of 
NPLANTS  would  have  declined,  along  with  the  mean  value  of  NSIC, 20 
between  1985  and  1989:  firms  became  smaller  as  they  de- 
diversified.  If  so,  then  de-diversification  might  not  have 
increased  productivity,  since  NPLANTS  has  a  positive  partial 
effect  on  plant  productivity.  Since  we  lack  time-series  data  on 
NPLANTS,  to  investigate  this  possibility  we  will  use  an 
alternative  measure  of  firm  size,  total  firm  employment 
(FIRMEMP),  which  is  available  for  the  subset  of  firms  included  in 
the  Compustat  Annual  Industrial  File.  We  calculated  the  ’ 
logarithm  of  the  ratio  of  the  value  of  FIRMEMP  in  1987  (the  most 
recent  year  for  which  fairly  complete  data  were  available)  to  its 
value  in  1984,  for  a  sample  of  1562  continuing  firms  with 
nonmissing  values  in  both  years.  The  mean  value  of  this  variable 
was  positive  (=.047)  and  significantly  different  from  zero  (t  = 
5.9)."  Thus  although,  as  shown  above,  continuing  firms  became 
decreasingly  diversified  (albeit  less  so  than  all  firms),  such 
firms  were  apparently  not  shrinking  during  roughly  the  same 
period.  Due  to  data  limitations,  this  test  is  not  conclusive, 
but  it  does  suggest  that  the  productivity  impact  of  declining 
diversification  was  not  offset  by  the  impact  of  declining  firm 
size. 
III.  Evaluation  of  the  Effectiveness  of  FASB/SEC  Regulations 
Concerning  the  Disclosure  of  Financial  Information  bv 
Industry  Seument 
In  the  mid-1970s,  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board 
11  We  eliminated  331  ltoutlierstV  with  absolute  values  of  this 
variable  greater  than  1.  Including  them  raised  the  mean  to  .llO. 21 
(FASB)  issued  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting  Standards  (SFAS) 
No.  14,  "Financial  Reporting  for  Segments  of  a  Business 
Enterprise".  This  Statement  required  firms  to  report  financial 
data  (for  fiscal  years  ending  after  December  15,  1977)  for 
industry  segments  which  accounted  for  10  percent  or  more  of  the 
consolidated  firm's  sales,  operating  profits,  or  assets.  SFAS 
No.  14  defined  an  industry  segment  as  'Ia component  of  an 
enterprise  engaged  in  providing  a  product  or  service,  or  a-.group 
of  related  products  or  services  primarily  to  unaffiliated 
customers  (i.e.,  customers  outside  the  enterprise)  for  a  profit." 
Since  this  definition  is  quite  general  and  perhaps  vague,  firms 
had  considerable  latitude  in  the  extent  and  nature  of 
segmentation  in  their  financial  reporting.  When,  or  soon  after, 
SFAS  No.  14  was  issued,  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission 
(SEC)  issued  Regulation  S-K,  "Instructions  Regarding  Disclosure," 
which  required  that  the  information  prescribed  by  SFAS  No.  14  be 
included  in  SEC  Form  10-K." 
The  SEC  was  not  the  only  government  agency  to  respond  (with 
a  lag)  to  the  increase  in  industrial  diversification  that 
l2 Both  SFAS  No.  14  and  Regulation  S-K  required  disclosure  of: 
sales  net,  operating  profit  (loss),  and  identifiable  assets.  FASB 
No.  14  also  required  disclosure  of:  depreciation,  depletion,  and 
amortization:  capital  expenditures:  equity  in  earnings;  investments 
in  equity;  the  name  and  amount  of  sales  to  each  customer,  and 
identification  of  each  industry  segment  or  segments  selling  to 
principal  customers.  Regulation  S-K  also  required  disclosure  of: 
order  backlog;  research  and  development  (company-  and  customer- 
sponsored);  employees:  the  amount  of  revenue  accounted  for  by  major 
products  or  groups  of  related  products  or  services:  and  the  names 
of  customers  from  whom  more  than  10  percent  of  consolidated 
revenues  are  derived. 22 
occurred  in  the  late  1960s  by  requiring  firms  to  disclose 
financial  data  for  industry  segments.  The  Federal  Trade 
Commission  (FTC)  also  did  so  (for  very  different  reasons)  by 
instituting  its  Line  of  Business  (LB)  Program13.  This  program, 
authorized  by  Section  6  of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  Act  (15 
U.S.C.  46),  required  firms  to  disaggregate  their  financial 
performance  statistics  into  a  maximum  of  261  three-  or  four-digit 
Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  manufacturing  industry 
categories.  However,  whereas  SFAS  No.  14/Regulation  S-K  required 
firms  to  disclose  segmented  financial  data  to  the  public,  only 
sworn  officers  and  employees  of  the  FTC  were  allowed  access  to 
the  LB  reports.14  For  a  number  of  reasons,  including  reluctance 
of  firms  to  respond  to  the  survey15  and  budgetary  pressures  at 
the  FTC,  the  survey  was  administered  in  only  four  years,  1974- 
1977. 
In  contrast,  Regulation  S-K  and  SFAS  No.  14  remain  in  effect 
to  this  day.  The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  assess  the 
effectiveness  of  these  regulations  by  examining  data  on  the 
extent  of  industry  segmentation  in  company  financial  reporting, 
and  by  comparing  these  to  data  on  the  "truet*  extent  of  industrial 
I3  See  Federal  Trade  Commission,  Bureau  of  Economics,  Report 
on  the  Line  of  Business  Program. 
14  Also,  Regulation  S-K  applied  to  all  publicly-held 
corporations,  while  fewer  than  500  of  the  nation's  largest 
manufacturing  corporations  were  required  to  file  LB  reports. 
I5 About  one-third  of  the  345  companies  ordered  to  file  the 
first  survey  were  parties  to  litigation  challenging  the  legality 
of  the  survey. 23 
diversification.  First  we  will  describe  the  data  upon  which  our 
analysis  is  based.  Next  we  will  present  time-series  evidence  on 
the  extent  of  segmentation  in  reporting.  We  will  then  consider 
alternative  potential  explanations  for  this  evidence. 
The  data  for  this  section  are  derived  from  the  Industry 
Segment  file,  another  subset  of  the  Business  Information 
Compustat  II  file  used  in  the  previous  section.  The  ultimate 
sources  of  the  data  in  the  Industry  Segment  file  are  also'Annua1 
Reports  to  Shareholders  and  10-K  Reports  to  the  SEC.  Data  for  up 
to  10  segments  per  company  are  reported  in  the  Industry  Segment 
file,  although  as  we  shall  see  below  the  fraction  of  firms  with 
10  (or  more)  reported  segments  never  exceeds  0.2  percent.  The 
file  is  longitudinal,  containing  up  to  seven  fiscal  years  of 
information  for  each  company.  If  data  for  a  particular  fiscal 
year  are  missing,  no  data  for  previous  fiscal  years  are  reported. 
Thus  the  file  is  subject  to  a  kind  of  censoring:  past  data  are 
not  available  for  firms  that  have  dropped  out  of  the  sample. 
As  part  of  the  file  documentation,  Compustat  provides  a  Data 
Availability  Report  (DAR).  Among  other  things,  the  DAR  reveals 
how  many  of  the  companies  present  in  the  file  have  N  reported 
industry  segments  (N  =  l,...,lO)  in  each  fiscal  year.  Thus,  one 
can  generate  for  each  year  a  frequency  distribution  of  companies, 
by  number  of  reported  industry  segments. 
We  had  access  to  DARs  corresponding  to  two  different 
"editions"  of  the  Industry  Segment  file.  The  first  DAR  is  for 
the  January  1984  edition  of  the  file,  and  contains  fairly 24 
complete  data  for  fiscal  years  1977-82;  the  second  is  for  the 
August  1988  edition,  and  contains  fairly  complete  data  for  1981- 
87.  Thus  we  can  generate  an  annual  time  series  of  distributions 
of  companies  by  N,  beginning  in  1977--about  the  time  the 
regulations  went  into  effect--and  ending  in  1987.16 
Data  on  the  percent  of  companies  in  the  Industry  Segment 
file  reporting  at  least  N  industry  segments,  by  year,  are 
presented  in  Table  5.  A  comparison  of  the  data  for  the  y&r  I985 
in  Tables  4  and  5  reveals  that  the  extent  of  segmentation  in 
reporting  is  very  low,  relative  to  the  true  extent  of  industrial 
diversification.  In  1985,  the  fraction  of  companies  with  more 
than  one  SIC  code  was  83.5  percent,  whereas  the  fraction  of 
companies  with  more  than  one  reported  segment  was  only  29.7 
percent. 
The  data  in  Table  5  also  reveal  a  sharp,  steady,  virtually 
monotonic  decline  over  time  in  the  percent  of  firms  with  at  least 
N  reported  segments,  for  every  value  of  N.  In  1977,  about  half 
of  the  included  companies  reported  at  least  two  industry 
segments,  and  a  third  reported  at  least  three.  By  1987,  these 
fractions  had  declined  to  about  one-quarter  and  one-seventh, 
respectively.  Moreover,  the  ratio  of  the  1987  to  the  1977 
percentage  tends  to  decline  as  N  increases:  the  relative  decline 
in  segmentation  is  greatest  at  the  "upper  tail"  of  the 
distribution. 
I6 Unfortunately,  we  lack  data  for  the  "pre-regulatory"  years 
prior  to  1977. 25 
We  will  consider  three  alternative  potential  explanations 
for  the  steady  decline  in  segmentation  in  reporting:  (1)  a 
decline  in  the  true  extent  of  diversification;  (2)  data 
censoring;  and  (3)  declining  enforcement  of,  and  compliance  with, 
the  spirit  (although  not  the  letter)  of  the  disclosure 
regulations. 
In  the  previous  section  we  established  that  the  true  extent 
of  industrial  diversification,  as  measured  by  the  number  of  SIC 
codes,  declined  significantly  from  1985  to  1989.  The  data 
suggest  that  a  decline  in  true  diversification  explains  part  of 
the  decline  in  the  reported  number  of  segments  between  1977  and 
1987,  but  only  a  small  part.  Table  6  juxtaposes  some  of  the  data 
for  1985  and  1989  from  Table  4  and  some  of  the  data  for  1982  and 
1987  from  Table  5;  the  latter  two  years  span  the  five-year  period 
closest  to  the  1985-89  period  analyzed  in  the  previous  section 
for  which  we  have  segment  data.  Each  line  of  the  table  shows  the 
percent  of  companies  with  values  of  NSIC  greater  than  X  in  1985 
and  1989,  and  the  percent  of  companies  with  NSEG  (the  number  of 
reported  industry  segments)  greater  than  Y  in  1982  and  1987.  The 
values  of  X  and  Y  were  chosen  so  that  the  1985  percentage  for 
NSIC  was  roughly  equal  to  the  1982  percentage  for  NSEG.  The 
table  reveals  that  there  were  much  greater  relative  declines  in 
the  NSEG  percentages  than  there  were  in  the  NSIC  percentages. 
For  example,  the  percent  of  companies  with  values  of  NSIC  >  5 
declined  20  percent  from  1985  to  1989,  from  12.3  to  9.9,  while 
the  percent  of  companies  with  values  of  NSEG  >  3  declined  46 26 
percent  from  1982  to  1987,  from  12.5  to  6.8. 
As  noted  above,  due  to  Compustat's  procedures  for  processing 
the  file  (i.e.,  including  companies  with  missing  data  for  early 
years  but  not  those  with  missing  data  for  middle  and  late  years), 
the  data  are  subject  to  censoring.  The  apparent  decline  in  the 
extent  of  segmentation  might  be  an  artifact  of  this  censoring. 
For  example,  firms  for  which  only  recent  years'  data  are 
available  might  be  hypothesized  to  be  newer,  smaller  fir&s\,  with 
fewer  industry  segments  than  large,  established,  continuing 
firms.  (On  the  other  hand,  firms  that  are  entirely  absent  from 
the  file  because  they  have  "dropped  out"  of  the  sample  also 
probably  had  few  segments;  this  would  tend  to  offset  the  bias.) 
Fortunately,  because  we  have  two  different  Vlsnapshots@U  (DARs), 
taken  almost  five  years  apart,  of  two  fiscal  years  (1981  and 
1982),  we  can  assess  the  extent  of  censoring-induced  bias  simply 
by  comparing  the  two  snapshots  of  the  same  year.  Substantial 
differences  between  the  two  snapshots  of  the  same  year  would 
suggest  that  the  bias  issue  is  an  important  one.  Table  5  shows 
distributions  of  companies  by  NSEG  in  1982,  as  reported  in  both 
the  1984  and  1988  DARs.17  Although  the  distribution  from  the 
later  DAR  lies  everywhere  above  that  from  the  earlier  DAR 
(consistent  with  the  presence  of  censoring-induced  bias),  the  two 
distributions  are  very  similar.  Moreover,  the  later  1982 
l7 The  extent  of  sample  attrition  is  suggested  by  the  fact  that 
the  1984  report  contained  1982  data  for  5651  companies,  whereas  the 
1988  report  contained  1982  data  for  only  4313  companies. 27 
distribution  is  almost  uniformly  below  the  1981  distribution,  and 
the  earlier  1982  distribution  is  almost  uniformly  above  the  1983 
distribution."  Data  censoring  therefore  appears  to  be 
responsible  for  a  negligible  fraction  of  the  total  estimated 
decline  in  the  extent  of  reported  segmentation. 
Instead,  it  appears  that  the  change  in  reporting  reflects  a 
decline  in  enforcement  of,  and  compliance  with,  the  spirit,  if 
\ 
not  the  letter,  of  Regulation  S-K.  That  there  may  have  be'en  'a 
decline  in  enforcement  during  the  1980s  is  not  too  surprising, 
since  it  is  well  known  that  the  enforcement  staffs  of  many 
federal  regulatory  agencies  were  drastically  reduced  during  the 
Reagan  Administration.  However  SEC  expenditures  increased  in 
real  terms  during  the  198Os,  from  $84  million  in  1980  to  $94 
million  in  1987  and  $111  million  in  1988.19  Moreover  the  decline 
in  segmentation  clearly  preceded  the  Reagan  Administration:  it 
began,  in  fact,  as  soon  as  the  regulation  went  into  effect  (if 
not  before).  The  immediate  and  uninterrupted  decline  in 
segmentation  may  simply  reflect  the  normal  time-path  of  response 
of  economic  agents  to  the  issuance  of  poorly-defined  regulations. 
In  this  context,  one  might  interpret  the  time-series  data  of 
Table  5  as  being  generated  by  a  process  of  diffusion  of 
noncompliance  (and  nonenforcement)  behavior  across  the  population 
I8  A  comparison  of  the  ttearlyVt  and  lllatell  distributions  for 
1981  yields  similar  results. 
I9 All  figures  are  in  constant  1982  dollars  and  are  reported 
in  Regulation,  1988  No.  3,  p.  12.  The  1988  figure  is  estimated. 28 
of  firms. 
Iv.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
During  the  quarter  century  following  the  Second  World  War, 
U.S.  industrial  enterprises  became  increasingly  diversified. 
Rumelt2'  has  estimated  that  the  percentage  of  diversified 
companies  in  the  Fortune  500  more  than  doubled  from  1949  to  1974, 
from  under  30  percent  to  over  60  percent.  The  greatest  increase 
in  the  extent  of  diversification  apparently  occurred  during  the 
conglomerate  merger  wave  of  the  late  196Os,  which  Golbe  and  White 
(1988)  have  shown  to  be  the  most  intense  period  of  merger  and 
acquisition  (M&A)  activity  between  1940  and  1985. 
Previous  studies  have  demonstrated  that  diversification 
tends  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  financial  variables  such  as 
profitability,  Tobin's  q  and  (in  recent  years)  stock  prices.  We 
have  provided  evidence  consistent  with  the  view  that 
diversification  has  a  negative  effect  on  technical  efficiency, 
i.e.  on  total-factor  productivity.  The  effect  of  diversification 
on  efficiency  might  be  regarded  as  an  important,  if  not  the  main, 
underlying  mechanism  by  which  diversification  influences 
financial  variables. 
Our  analysis,  based  on  Census 
thousand  plants  in  1980,  indicated 
number  of  the  parent  firm's  plants 
Bureau  data  for  over  17 
that  holding  constant  the 
(and  other  variables),  the 
greater  the  number  of  industries  in  which  the  parent  firm 
20  Cited  by  Bhide  (1989,  p.  53). 29 
operates,  the  lower  the  productivity  of  its  plants.  This 
suggests  that  the  conglomerate  merger  boom  of  the  late  1960s  may 
have  contributed  to  the  slowdown  in  U.S.  productivity  growth 
which  began  at  or  slightly  after  that  time. 
If  diversification  is  bad  for  productivity,  and  therefore 
for  profitability,  why  did  managers  pursue  aggressive 
diversification  strategies  in  the  late  196Os?  One  possible 
explanation  is  that  managers  were  interested  in  maximizing. 
shareholder  wealth  but  that  they  miscalculated,  and  expected 
diversifying  acquisitions  to  yield  profitable  synergies.  An 
alternative  explanation  is  in  the  spirit  of  Jensen's  free  cash- 
flow  theory.  Firms  were  generating  large  cash  flows,  their 
managers  preferred  using  these  cash  flows  to  finance  acquisitions 
to  paying  dividends  to  shareholders,  and  the  latter  were  unable 
to  force  managers  to  do  so.  Due  to  vigorous  antitrust 
enforcement,  managers  were  unable  to  acquire  firms  in  the  same 
line  of  business,  which  would  have  been  both  technically 
efficient  and  highly  profitable,  although  not  necessarily 
socially  desirable.  Therefore  firms  acquired  business  units  in 
unrelated  industries,  even  though  they  knew  little  about  these 
businesses  and  were  unlikely  to  be  able  to  manage  them 
efficiently.21 
21  Wernerfelt  and  Montgomery  offer  another  explanation  of  why 
firms  may  be  prompted  to  diversify,  even  if  diversification  reduces 
the  firm's  profitability.  They  argue  that  firms  may  have  excess 
capacity  of  less-than-perfectly  marketable  factors,  and  that  the 
marginal  returns  to  these  factors  declines  as  the  firm  diversifies 
beyond  the  first  industry  chosen. The  extent  of  industrial  diversification  probably  peaked 




the  mid-1970s  conglomerate  firms  began  to  divest  the  unrelated 
(to  their  primary  industry)  and  unprofitable  lines  of  business 
they  had  acquired  during  the  1960s.  A  substantial  fraction  of 
the  corporate  control  transactions  of  the  1970s  were  divestitures 
of  previously-acquired  units. 
But  much  larger  declines  in  the  extent  of  diversification 
probably  occurred  in  the  1980s.  The  rate  of  business  ownership 
change  was  much  higher  in  the  1980s  than  it  had  been  in  the 
1970s.22  Deregulation,  intensified  foreign  competition,  junk- 
bond  financing,  and  relaxed  antitrust  enforcement  may  have 
contributed  to  this  increase  in  takeover  activity.  Moreover,  the 
nature  of  corporate  control  transactions  changed  in  the  1980s. 
Hostile,  "bust-up"  takeovers  undertaken  by  "corporate  raiders", 
along  with  leveraged  buyouts  (which  are  frequently  followed  by 
asset  sales),  accounted  for  a  rapidly  growing  share  of  overall 
takeover  activity.  The  size  of  the  average  and  largest  takeover 
targets  also  increased  dramatically  during  the  1980s. 
Using  Compustat  data,  we  have  shown  that  the  extent  of 
industrial  diversification  declined  significantly  during  the 
22  Unpublished  Census  Bureau  data  indicate  that  the  average 
annual  rate  of  ownership  change  among  fairly  large  manufacturing 
plants  increased  from  2.3  percent  during  1973-79  to  4.2  percent-- 
an  80  percent  increase--during  1979-86.  Moreover,  the  lowest 
annual  rate  in  the  second  period  (3.3  percent  in  1979-80)  was 
greater  than  the  highest  annual  rate  in  the  first  period  (3.2 
percent  in  1973-74). 31 
second  half  of  the  1980s.  The  mean  number  of  industries  in  which 
firms  operated  declined  by  14  percent  from  January  1985  to 
November  1989.  Two  factors  contributed  to  this  decline:  firms 
that  were  "bornl'  during  this  period  were  much  less  diversified 
than  those  that  lldied~~,  and  l~continuingl~  firms  reduced  the  number 
of  industries  in  which  they  operated.  The  fraction  of  companies 
that  were  highly  diversified  --operating  in  more  than  20 
industries  --declined  37  percent,  and  the  fraction  of  single-. 
industry  companies  increased  54  percent.  The  apparent 
acceleration  in  the  rate  of  de-diversification  from  the  1970s  to 
the  1980s  contributed  to  the  acceleration  in  the  rate  of  U.S. 
productivity  growth,  but  it  is  difficult  to  determine  the 
magnitude  of  this  contribution. 
We  have  also  examined  another  issue  related  to  industrial 
diversification:  the  effectiveness  of  FASB  and  SEC  regulations 
concerning  company  disclosure  of  financial  information  for  its 
industry  segments.  Our  findings  indicate  that,  because  firms  are 
free  to  define  industry  segments  as  they  see  fit,  the 
effectiveness  of  these  regulations  was  low  when  they  were 
introduced  in  the  1970s  and  has  been  declining  ever  since.  In 
1985,  only  30  percent  of  the  companies  in  Compustatls  Industry 
Segment  file  reported  data  for  more  than  one  industry  segment, 
whereas  84  percent  were  truly  multi-industry  firms.  Moreover  the 
extent  of  industry  segmentation  in  financial  reporting  has 
declined  much  faster  than  the  extent  of  true  diversification: 
between  1977  and  1987,  the  fraction  of  companies  reporting  data 32 
for  at  least  two  industry  segments  declined  from  one-half  to  one- 
quarter.  This  is  unfortunate  because  appropriately  segmented 
financial  data  for  diversified  firms  are  necessary,  or  at  least 
highly  useful,  for  both  economic  policymaking  and  for  economic 
and  financial  research.23 
23  Lichtenberg  and  Siegel  (1989c)  have  shown  that  segmented 
data  permit  more  efficient  estimates  of  companies'  total-factor 
productivity  growth  and  of  the  rate  of  return  to  research  and 
development  investment  than  consolidated  company  data. 33 
TABLE  1 
Descriptive  Statistics  for  Sample  of  17,664  Plants 
STATIST  RESIDUA  SINGLE 
Ic  14 
Mean  0  .07 




. 05  -.31  -- 
. 25  -.12  -- 
. 50  -.Ol  -- 
. 75  . 10  -- 
.95  .31  -- 
NPLANTS  NINDS 
23  9 
29  11 
1  1  . 03  0  45 
2  1  .  11  0  144 
11  5  .  31  .04  284 
34  13  1  .  10  517 
82  28  1  .  28  4562 
SAMEIND  AUXSHAR  PLANTEM 
E  P 
.45  .07  525 
.  38  .14  1107 
Correl. 
Coeffs. 
*  - 
SINGLE  -.06 
NPLANTS  .08  -.33 
NINDS  .07  -.35  .94 
SAMEIND  -.06  .39  -.81  -.90 
AUXSHAR  .06  -.15  .28  .25  -.25 
E 
PLANTEM  .03  -.05  .04  .07  -.06  -.Ol 
P 
* Log  transformation  applied  to  NPLANTS,  NINDS,  and  PLANTEMP. 34 
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TABLE  3 
MEAN  NUMBER  OF  SIC  CODES  IN  1985  AND  1989 
(Standard  error  of  mean  in  parentheses) 
Companies  included 




Continuing  companies  5.94 
(.103) 
Births  --- 
1989  Chanse 
4.70  -0.76 
(.061)  (.048) 
5.67  -0.27 
(.097)  (.063) 
3.70  ---  \ 
Deaths  4.78 
(.104) 
(.069) 
V-V  W-V 
Note : There  were  6505  companies  in  1985  and  7541  companies  in 
1989,  3829  continuing  companies,  3712  births,  and  2676  deaths. 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on  January  1985  and  November 
1989  Business  Information  Compustat  II  SIC  files. 36 
TABLE  4 
PERCENT  OF  COMPANIES  WITH  1985  AND  1989  VALUES  OF  NSIC  IN 
SELECTED  RANGES 
Ranse 
NSIC  =  1 
Percent  of  comnanies  with  NSIC  in  range  in: 
1985  1989 
16.5  25.4 
NSIC  LE  2  35.4  43.6 
NSIC  LE  3  50.3  57.4 
NSIC  GT  5  31.1  26.0 
NSIC  GT  10  12.3  9.9 
NSIC  GT  20  3.5  2.2 
NSIC  GT  30  1.3  0.8 
Note : These  calculations  are  based  on  all  6505  observations  in 
1985  SIC  file  and  all  7541  observations  in  1989  SIC  file. 37 











PERCENT  OF  COMPANIES  IN  COMPUSTAT  INDUSTRY  SEGMENT  FILE 
REPORTING  AT  LEAST  N  INDUSTRY  SEGMENTS,  BY  YEAR,  1977-1986 
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2.5  2.2 
1.1  1.0 
0.6  0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2  0.2 
0.1  0.1 
Total 
Number 
of  Firms 
[ -----Aug.  1988  Report------] 
82  83  84  85  86  87 
37.9  35.3  33.2  29.7  27.4  27.3 
23.0  21.0  19.3  16.7  15.0  14.8 
12.5  11.4  9.9  8.0  7:.$  .6.8 
5.8  5.0  4.1  3.2  2.8  2.8 
2.5  2.2  1.6  1.3  1.2  1.1 
1.1  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.5 
0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2 
0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1 
0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
3811  4460  4660  5034  5388  5651  4313  4775  5224  6100  6735  6135 38 
TABLE  6 
PERCENT  OF  FIRMS  WITH  1985  AND  1989  VALUES  OF  NSIC  GREATER  THAN 
x  (X =  5,  10,  20,  30)  AND  WITH  1982  AND  1987  NSEG  VALUES 
GREATER  THAN  Y  (Y =  1,  3,  5,  6) 
(3)  (6) 
NSIC  Percent  of  compa-  Ratio  NSEG  Percent  of  compa-  Ratio 
ranqe  nies  in NSIC  ranqe:  (2)/(l)  range  nies  in  NSEG  ranse:  (5)/(4 
1985  1989  1982  1987 
NSIC  >  5  31.1  26.0  0.84  NSEG  >  1  37.9  27i.G  0.72 
NSIC  >  10  12.3  9.9  0.80  NSEG  >  3  12.5  6.8  0.54 
NSIC  >  20  3.5  2.2  0.63  NSEG  >  5  2.5  1.1  0.44 
NSIC  >  30  1.3  0.8  0.62  NSEG>6  1.1  0.5  0.45 39 
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